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NOTES

right of anonymous political association is not protected from
governmental invasion to the same degree as the rights of free
speech and belief.
Robert S. Cooper, Jr.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

RIGHT OP STATES TO

INVESTIGATE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

Appellant, an officer of a New Hampshire corporation which
operated a summer camp, was summoned by the State Attorney
General' to testify in regard to certain alleged subversive activities. Appellant answered all questions regarding his own
activities, but refused to produce a list of names of persons who
had attended the last two sessions of the camp. After refusing to
comply with a state court order to produce the lists, which was
issued pursuant to a motion by the Attorney General, appellant
was held in civil contempt and confined to jail until he should
see fit to comply with the order. The sentence was affirmed by
the State Supreme Court. 2 Appellant's defenses were: (1) that
the state statute authorizing the investigation had been rendered null by the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Pennsylvania v. Nelson 3 which held that the field of subversion
had been occupied by federal legislation to the exclusion of the
states; and (2) that the state was precluded from compelling the
disclosure by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend4
ment. On the first appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
appellant was successful in obtaining a remand of the case for
reconsideration in the light of the Court's recent decision in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire.5 The New Hampshire Supreme Court
reaffirmed its previous decision.6 On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, held, affirmed, four Justices dissenting.7 The
1. An act of the New Hampshire legislature empowered the Attorney General
of the state to act as a one-man investigating committee to ascertain if there were
persons located within the state who were defined by statute as "subversive."

N.H. Laws, ch. 197 (1955). See note 11 infra.
2. Wyman v. Uphaus, 100 N.H. 436, 130 A.2d 278 (1957).
3. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
4. Uphaus v. Wyman, 355 U.S. 16 (1957).

5. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
6. Wyman v. Uphaus, 101 N.H. 139, 136 A.2d 221 (1957).
7. Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Warren dissented on the ground that the
rights of appellant of speech and those of assembly of the persons who attended
the camp could not be subordinated to the rights of the state of New Hampshire
because they could find no rational connection between the investigation and a
valid legislative purpose. Although the dissent was joined by Justices Black and
Douglas, they also concluded that the sentence of contempt, which grew out of
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states are competent to investigate subversive activities directed
against the state government, and the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not preclude the states from compelling a disclosure of this type by use of the contempt power,
where the states are making a valid investigation. Uphaus v.
Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,8 the Supreme Court held a
conviction under the same statute invalid under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Four of the Justices, subscribing to the main opinion of the Court, found that there had
been a denial of procedural due process. The basis of the main
opinion was that the state legislature, in appointing the Attorney
General as a one-man investigating committee, had separated its
power to investigate from its responsibility to use that power.
The standard of authorization, which allowed the Attorney General to act on any information which was "reasonable or reliable" 9 was found to lack an adequate safeguard for the protection of witnesses called to testify. Further, these Justices were
of the opinion that, in the absence of a state court ruling that
the legislature desired the particular information sought, the
Attorney General was acting beyond his delegated authority.
Finding that it was impossible for the witness to ascertain
whether the information he was called upon to divulge was within the authority of the committee to request, the main opinion
held that the use of the contempt power to elicit such information was a denial of procedural due process. In a concurring
opinion, which was necessary to constitute a majority of the
Court, Justice Frankfurter found a denial of substantive due
process of law. He stated that the Court was precluded from
looking into this delegation of state powers and was bound by
the findings of the highest state court as to its validity. 10 Howthe investigation, was a violation of the constitutional prohibition against bills

of attainder.
8. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
9. Id. at 252.
10. Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 105 A.2d 756 (1954) merely upheld and
defined the actions of the attorney general as a legislative function as opposed to

an executive function and as such was held valid under the state law. The four
Justices who wrote the main opinion in the Sweezy case would seem to require a
state court decision regarding each particular individual under investigation as to
the desire of the legislature in obtaining the particular information that he was
being asked to reveal. In the absence of such a holding they reasoned that the
attorney general was acting beyond his scope of authority because of the vague-

ness of the statute authorizing the investigations. See note 1 supra. Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand, was willing to treat this holding of the State Supreme
Court as binding as to the authority of the attorney general, and would preclude
inquiry of the type indulged in by the main opinion as to the desire of the state
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ever, Justice Frankfurter determined that the Court could question the validity of the investigation in relation to the particular
individual involved. To accomplish this process the need of the
legislature in obtaining the information sought was balanced
against the constitutional rights of Sweezy. In this balancing
process, Justice Frankfurter took notice, as did the main opinion,
that the rights of academic and political freedom were here involved. Taking these particular rights involved into consideration and balancing them against the inherent right of the state
to self-preservation, he reached the conclusion that no rational
basis had been demonstrated between this right of the state and
the information sought, which would justify the invasion of
Sweezy's rights. Therefore, the use of the contempt power was a
violation of substantive due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In the instant case, it appears that the majority have adopted
Justice Frankfurter's position in the Sweezy decision. The Court
accepted the finding of the State Supreme Court as to the investigative committee's scope of authority and the desire of the
legislature in obtaining the information demanded of appellant.
The Court then moved into the substantive aspects of the due
process problem, employing the balancing process used by Justice
Frankfurter in the Sweezy case. Upon examination, the evidence
that prompted the Attorney General to call the appellant before
the committee was found to create a nexus between the corporation with which the appellant was affiliated and subversive
activities, sufficient to warrant investigation. The Court then
found that this investigation was based on the state's inherent
right to self-preservation, which in this case was more particularly the identification of "subversive persons"" within the
state. Assuming that the appellant was competent to assert the
rights of those whose names appeared on the lists, 12 the Court
legislature in obtaining particular information from individual witnesses. He would
merely ascertain through the balancing process if there was a rational basis between the interest of the state in obtaining the information, and whether or not
this interest was sufficiently demonstrated to exist.
11. N.H. REV. STAT. ch. 588, § 1 (1955), defines "subversive person": "'Subversive person' means any person who commits, attempts to commit, or aids in
the commission, or advocates, abets, advises or teaches, by any means any person
to commit, attempt to commit, or aid in the commission of any act intended to
overthrow, destroy or alter, or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration
of, the constitutional form of the government of the United States, or of the state
of New Hampshire, or any political subdivision of either of them, by force, or
violence; or who is a member of a subversive organization or a foreign subversive

organization."
12. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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found that their rights were those of privacy of political association. In balancing the right of the state to preserve itself on the
one hand, and the rights of appellant and the others to keep
their political associations private on the other, the Court concluded that the right of self-preservation was the stronger of
the conflicting claims. Further, it was found that the relationship between the information desired and this interest of the
state was demonstrated to exist to a degree sufficent to override
the rights of appellant and the others whose names would be
exposed.' 3 Therefore, the court held that the use of the contempt
power to elicit this information was not a denial of substantive

due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In dealing with the appellant's contention that the decision

in the Nelson case had rendered this type of state action null and
void, the Court held that this was not a correct interpretation
of that decision, noting that the same contention had been raised
in the Sweezy case and had been denied sub silentio.14 In the
Nelson case as it finally reached the United States Supreme
Court, respondent had been convicted in a state court for advocating the violent overthrow of the government of the United
States.' 5 The Supreme Court held that the conviction could not
13. Cf. ibid., where the Supreme Court held that the State of Alabama had not
shown sufficient interest to force the production of membership lists from the defendant organization on the basis of an investigation to see if laws of the state
regulating intrastate business were being violated. It is to be noted that the
organization produced all relevant business records and charters, refusing only to
produce the names of "rank and file" members on the basis that economic and
other reprisals would follow. The Court found this to be highly probable and
denied the state the right to these lists on the basis that insufficient need for them
had been established.
Also of note in the instant case is that New Hampshire has had a law since
1927 which requires all operators of hotels, lodges, etc., to keep a record of all
guests; which record is to be open for inspection by any sheriff, deputy or local
police officer. It would appear that the summer camp involved was covered by
this statute. N.H. REV. STAT. ch. 353, § 3 (1955).
14. Wyman v. Uphaus, 360 U.S. 72, 77 (1959).
15. The original indictment against Nelson contained twelve counts, eight of
which were for sedition against the State of Pennsylvania. However, when the
case was reviewed and the conviction reversed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 92 A.2d 431 (1952), Justice
Jones held that the record disclosed no evidence of any sedition against the state,
and upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the only consideration seems
to have been the four counts charging sedition against the United States. At the
time of the Pennsylvania prosecution under its sedition statutes, PA. STAT. ANN.
18:4207 (1945), Nelson had been convicted under the Smith Act in the federal
courts for sedition against the United States. United States v. Mesarosh, 116 F.
Supp. 345 (W.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd, 223 F.2d 449 (3d Cir. 1955) (the federal
prosecution was brought under Nelson's Yugoslavian name, rather than his assumed
American name). It is possible that in this case the United States Supreme Court
was partially moved by the fact that this involved double punishment for the same
offense, as was the case in United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). However,
that case upheld a conviction under the federal prohibition law following a con-
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stand as the Congress had occupied the field of investigation
and prosecution of subversion against the United States. Therefore, all state laws, even those designed to be supplemental, must
fall before this federal occupancy of the field. In the instant case,
the Court held that the decision reached in the Nelson case does
not prevent the states from enforcing laws enacted to protect the
states from subversion. Thus, it appears that the present status
of the Nelson decision is that it merely proscribes prosecution by
the individual states for sedition directed against the national
government, but has not in any manner restricted their inherent
right of self-preservation.
In conclusion, the instant case is significant for several reasons. First, it has clarified the holding of the Nelson decision,
which has been the subject of much speculation and proposed
legislative action. 16 It now appears that the Court in that decision, as interpreted in the instant case, merely proscribed prosecution by the states for sedition against the United States, but
has left the states free to investigate and punish sedition against
their own political entities. This interpretation rejects the
contention that sedition against the government of any state
amounts to sedition against the United States, which would mean
that there could be no sedition prosecutions by any state, following the Nelson decision. 17 Secondly, the Court in the instant case
followed its repeated doctrine of accepting the decision of the
highest state court on the question of delegation of state authority. ' Further, it appears that an identification of the particular interests of the individual as opposed to that of the state
is very important in this area. This is pointed up by the fact
viction under the state liquor laws. It is submitted that from the language of the

Court that possibly four members thereof were ready to overrule the Lanza case.
But see Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), which upheld a conviction for
bank robbery under a state law following an acquittal on a federal charge which
makes it a crime to rob a federally insured bank. However, the question of double
prosecution was avoided in the Nelson case by finding federal occupancy of the
field of investigation and prosecution of sedition directed against the United States.
Since the case came up for review only on those counts of the indictment which
charged Nelson with this crime rather than sedition against the State of Pennsylvania, the question of whether the states can prosecute for sedition directed
against their separate entities was left open for speculation. See Hunt, State Control of Sedition: The Smith Act as the Supreme Law of the Land, 41 MINN. L.

REV. 287 (1957).
16. See Hunt, State Control of Sedition: The Smith Act as the Supreme Law

of the Land, 41 MINN. L. REv. 287, 327-32 (1957) ; Note, 19 LoUISIANA LAW
REviEw 864 (1959).
17. See Hunt, State Control of Sedition: The Smith Act as the Supreme Law
of the Land, 41 MINN. L. REv. 287, 326 (1957) ; Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 134

N.E.2d 13 (Mass. 1956).
18. See, e.g., Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902).
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that the state court in the instant case had particularized the
interest of the state to an extent which was not present in the
Sweezy decision. It also seems to appear that the Court may be
developing a distinction between the right of anonymous political
association as presented in the instant case and the other First
Amendment freedoms, such as those of political association and
academic freedom as found in the Sweezy decision. Apparently,
these latter freedoms will be given somewhat more protection
from invasion than the former. 19 It is to be noted that the Court
in the instant case did not treat the matter of procedural due
process. This may be accounted for by the fact that the Court
had before it a determination by the highest state court as to the
state legislature's desire for the information sought, a circumstance not present in the Sweezy case. However, it is to be
remembered that the Court has repeatedly stated that each due
process case will largely turn on the facts there presented.20 For
this reason it is not felt that the instant case necessarily stands
for the proposition that procedural due process will not be inquired into in future cases of like nature.
Robert S. Cooper, Jr.
CRIMINAL LAW -

STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL STATUTES

Defendant was convicted of public intimidation of an officer
for a battery committed while he was an inmate at the state penitentiary. The basis of the conviction was the fact that he had
struck a prison guard who seized his arm when he ignored a re19. Compare Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344 (1959); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958) ; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), with Barrenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) and Wyman v. Uphaus, 360 U.S. 72
(1959).
20. E.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Cf.
Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344 (1959), where the Supreme Court reversed a conviction of contempt when petitioner refused to answer questions propounded by a
Virginia state legislative committee authorized to investigate: (1) tax structure
of racial organizations, (2) the effect of integration or its threat on public schools
of Virginia and the state's general welfare, and (3) violation of statutes on
champerty, barratry, and maintenance or unauthorized practice of law. The 'basis
of the decision was that the petitioner was not informed of the pertinency of the
questions asked and whether or not any of them fell into one of the three areas
authorized for investigation. As a result, any conviction for refusal to answer
under these circumstances would result in a denial of procedural due process of
law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court cited NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958), and said that this was an imposition on a troubled area of speech,
press, and association in an area of great public interest. Four members of the
Court reiterated their position announced in the Sweezy case that they could not
at this time think of any circumstances which would be sufficient to permit an
invasion by the states into these areas of constitutionally protected rights.

